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We review a diversity of studies of human social in-
teraction and highlight the importance of social sig-
nals. We also discuss recent findings from social
cognitive neuroscience that explore the brain basis
of the capacity for processing social signals. These
signals enable us to learn about the world from
others, to learn about other people, and to create
a shared social world. Social signals can be
processed automatically by the receiver and may
be unconsciously emitted by the sender. These sig-
nals are non-verbal and are responsible for social
learning in the first year of life. Social signals can
also be processed consciously and this allows auto-
matic processing to be modulated and overruled.
Evidence for this higher-level social processing is
abundant from about 18 months of age in humans,
while evidence is sparse for non-human animals.
We suggest that deliberate social signalling requires
reflective awareness of ourselves and awareness of
the effect of the signals on others. Similarly, the
appropriate reception of such signals depends on
the ability to take another person’s point of view.
This ability is critical to reputation management, as
this depends on monitoring how our own actions
are perceived by others.We speculate that the devel-
opment of these high level social signalling sys-
tems goes hand in hand with the development of
consciousness.
Introduction
Social cognition [1] is the sum of those processes that
allow individuals of the same species (conspecifics) to
interact with one another. Such interaction is a matter
of survival, for individuals as well as for the species as
a whole. Essentially it depends upon the exchange of
signals. While speech is the most obvious signal that
typifies social communication in humans, there are
many other more basic signals, which humans share
with other social animals. For example, facial expres-
sion and body posture tell us what someone may be
feeling [2]. By monitoring eye gaze we can learn where
someone is focussing their attention, and likewise, by
watching their body movements we can infer what
they are intending to do [3]. Many animals make use
of such signals emanating from both conspecifics
and members of other species [4,5]. We assume that
human social cognition includes all the processes
that are used by other social animals, many of which
are discussed elsewhere in this special issue, but
1 Welcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging at University College
London, UK. 2 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University
College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK.
3 Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus
University, Denmark.
Email: cfrith@fil.ion.ucl.ac.ukalso includes special processes that are unique to
humans. Presumably, it is these processes that have
allowed the development of language, institutionalised
teaching and what we generally consider under the
label of culture. A novel question that we will consider
in the last section of this review is whether these pro-
cesses also determine the nature of human conscious
experience.
In this review we make a distinction between signals
that are processed automatically and those that are
processed deliberately. We assume that most social
signals are processed automatically and without
awareness. They provide information about the person
from whom the signal emanates (the sender). Neither
sender nor receiver need be aware that they are
exchanging signals. Whether or not this information
is valid, is another matter. We treat people as danger-
ous or trustworthy on the basis of their appearance,
without knowing anything else about them. We auto-
matically read peoples’ emotions from their faces
regardless of whether these are acted or true. Auto-
matic signals also tell us about the things or the people
the sender is interacting with. An expression of disgust
tells us that we should avoid whatever the sender is
eating. Another person’s eye gaze direction tells us
where we may find something interesting in the envi-
ronment. Signals can also tell us about the interaction
in which we are engaged. When we interact with some-
one we often mirror each other’s movements and man-
nerisms. We are unaware of this mirroring, but when it
occurs it creates the feeling that we have good rapport
with each other — the chameleon effect [6]. Interest-
ingly, the rapport associated with the chameleon effect
may be destroyed if we become aware that we are
being imitated [7]. Instead we may feel we are being
mocked.
So what is the benefit of higher-level processing of
social signals? Social interactions enable a dramatic
increase in the possibilities for group actions when sig-
nalling is conscious. The critical feature of deliberate
and conscious signalling is that we recognise that
the signals are signals and therefore imbued with
meaning. We suggest that, when both sender and
receiver are aware that they are exchanging signals,
then uniquely human communication can emerge. In
this essay we shall present some of the evidence for
these two different levels of signalling and review stud-
ies on the brain basis underlying the capacity to
exchange social signals.
Learning about the World from Other People
The story of little Albert, who was conditioned by
Watson and Rayner [8] to be afraid of a white rat, is
much quoted to show the powerful effects, the gener-
alisation and the persistence of classical conditioning.
But one of the critical advantages of being a social,
rather than a solitary, animal is that we can learn about
the world thorough the experience of other people
without needing to have first hand experience. Social
learning enables us to avoid sickness from eating a
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thing ourselves and receive punishment for incorrect
responses; we can avoid punishment by observing an-
other’s fate, hearing about another’s past experience
and even from reading about the accumulated experi-
ences of many generations of people.
One of the most basic means we use for social
learning is to follow eye gaze. In all likelihood, the
direction of someone’s gaze will point to something
of interest and importance for us. This effect is indeed
automatic and obligatory. For example, in the experi-
ment of Bayliss and Tipper [9], discussed below, the
participants still attended in the direction indicated
by the gaze of another person, even when this person
consistently looked away from the target the partici-
pant was trying to detect.
As well as following peoples’ eye movements, we
also covertly mirror many of the facial expressions
that we see and, as a result, experience the same
emotions in ourselves [10]. This is the case for pain
[11], fear [12] and disgust [13]. When we see such
expressions in others we can learn something about
the world and, by mirroring these expressions, we
can adopt the appropriate response. If we see a fear-
ful face looking at a particular location in space, it
is likely that, at that location, there is something
that we too should be afraid of. Thus, we can get
ready to run away even before we have verified the
target.
The use of another person’s emotional reactions to
guide our response to novel situations is called social
referencing. Human infants tend to reference the
mother’s expression, when faced with a novel object.
Thus, generally speaking, if the mother shows fear,
infants will tend to avoid touching the toy, but if she
shows pleasure, they will explore it [14]. This learning
is not confined to children. Adults too can learn to as-
sociate a fear response to a stimulus by watching
someone else receiving a mild shock every time they
see that stimulus [15].
This kind of social signal does not require higher level
conscious processing. In seminal studies on observa-
tional learning with rhesus monkeys, Mineka and col-
leagues [16,17] showed that infant monkeys who had
never met a snake, having been born into a safe labora-
tory colony, rapidly acquired fear of snakes when
observing a model in a video being afraid of a snake.
In contrast, they did not acquire fear of a flower even
after 12 trials of observation. By its evolutionary history
the brain is pre-prepared to learn archaically threaten-
ing stimuli [16,17]. Thus, little Albert probably would
have learned on one trial to be afraid of a snake simply
by watching another person being afraid.
Do we learn more easily from another person whom
we trust and to whom we ascribe knowledge? It is
likely that we do, but experimental and neurophysio-
logical evidence on this point is still sparse. The exper-
iments on social referencing nearly always use the
mother as the sender of the signal. Normally, the
mother will be the most trustworthy and knowledge-
able person that a very young and inexperienced
individual interacts with. However, in the course of
development, the models used for social learning
change. While 14-month-old infants do not learn froma complete stranger in a social referencing situation
[18], they will learn from a familiarized stranger [19].
By the age of 24 months, strangers are used as
a source for social learning [20]. Peers as social
models become particularly important in later child-
hood and adolescence, and we all use public figures
and icons as role models for social learning and
emulate their style.
How does our brain assess the quality and validity of
a social signal? There is an inherent ambiguity about
a person’s attitude to an object. When we observe a
person gazing at an object, this may correctly indi-
cate that the object is highly desirable and should be
approached, but the response could also indicate
something about that person’s idiosyncratic likes
and dislikes, rather than something about the object.
For example, some people consider rhubarb to be
vile, while others consider it a delicacy. Gergely and
colleagues [21] have shown that 14-month-old infants
use social referencing to learn about the value of
objects, but do not seem to recognise that different
people may have different attitudes to the same
object. It is only by about 18 months that infants use
social referencing to learn about people’s disposi-
tions. At this point they can recognise that a nice
object may be disliked by some people. Once this
stage is reached social signals can be treated by
both sender and receiver as deliberately communica-
tive. We will discuss this in more detail later.
Learning about Other People
Many cues are available for learning about peoples’
dispositions, both stable personality traits as well as
ever changing intentions and emotions. A host of
social psychological experiments have shown that
we are quick judges of other peoples’ competence
and warmth [22]. For instance, after looking at a per-
son’s face for 100 milliseconds, we decide whether
they are trustworthy or not and this judgement does
not change when given longer time to study the face
[23]. The sight of a person with an untrustworthy face
elicits activity in the amygdala (see Figure 1) even
when we have not been explicitly asked to judge
whether the person is trustworthy or not [24]. A major
role of the amygdala is to attach value (either positive
or negative) to stimuli as in fear conditioning [25,26].
Such stimuli do not need to be social, but through
such conditioning we can learn to approach people
with trustworthy faces and avoid people with untrust-
worthy faces.
Prejudice
Although there is widespread agreement among
groups of people about what an untrustworthy face
looks like, there is no evidence that this characterisa-
tion has any validity. This is an example of unjustified
prejudice, presumably derived from cultural norms
and innate preferences for one’s own family and for
privileged groups of people rather than from direct
experience. Thus, in-groups and out-groups can be
identified in every society. Some groups are acknowl-
edged as more privileged than others and attract the
positive stereotypes, whereas others attract negative
stereotypes. For instance, children showed consistent
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R726Figure 1. Location of key brain areas
involved in social cognition on the lateral
(pink) and medial (blue) surface of the
brain.
The amygdala, a complex structure buried
in the anterior temporal lobe is involved in
attaching value, for example, trustworthi-
ness, to objects, for example, faces [24].
The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is
consistently activated when thinking
about the mental states of self and others
[98,99]. Activity in the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) and the anterior insula (AI,
buried between frontal and temporal
lobes) is associated with experience of
emotions such as pain and disgust in self
and others [13,45]. Activity in the inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) and interparietal sulcus
(IPS) occurs in response to action execu-
tion and action observation [35,36]. Activ-
ity in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)
seems to be associated with perspective
taking [101,102], both spatial and mental,
and hence with understanding false be-
liefs [86,103]. Activity in the posterior
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is elicited
by action observation [38] and when read-
ing intentions from actions [40,41].preferences for lucky groups compared to unlucky
ones defined as victims of uncontrollable natural
disasters [27]. The evolutionary benefit of making
alliances with fortunate, rather than unfortunate,
groups of people explains the apparent ease with
which we harbour negative feelings towards the dis-
advantaged. Prejudice, while increasing inequality
and offending our rational mind as well as our sense
of fairness, is based on an automatic mechanism,
which may have evolved for coping with situations
where we have no prior knowledge of the person we
are confronting [28].
Our irrational feelings reveal their strength in
autonomic and brain imaging measures. When white
Americans were shown the faces of unknown black
Americans, activity was elicited in the amygdala [29].
The magnitude of the activity in the amygdala corre-
lated with an implicit measure of race prejudice (the
Implicit Association Test), an important tool for investi-
gating the presence of unconscious prejudices [30,31].
In this example, black faces have become conditioned
stimuli for fear responses largely through cultural
transmission rather than direct experience. The amyg-
dala response is not elicited by the faces of familiar and
positively regarded black Americans [29]. In this case,
the prejudice applied to the group has been overcome
through learning about specific individuals.
Experience
We can learn to trust or distrust specific individuals
through direct interaction. Singer and colleagues [32]
invited participants to play trust and reciprocity games
with people they had not met before. In fact, only pho-
tographs of their faces were shown. The game was de-
signed so that some people reliably reciprocated trust
(co-operators), while others usually defected. Partici-
pants rapidly came to like the faces of co-operators
and to dislike the faces of the defectors. Indeed, theyactually rated the faces of the co-operators as more at-
tractive, even though the same face was assigned to
be cooperators for some participants and defectors
for others. Faces that had acquired value (co-opera-
tors and defectors versus neutral) elicited more activity
in the amygdala. Thus, participants rated the same
faces as either attractive or unattractive depending
entirely on their behaviour in the game.
It is important to rule out that these effects did not
arise simply because of negative feelings about mone-
tary losses associated with some faces, and positive
feelings about gains associated with other faces.Partic-
ipants had been told that some of the players were sim-
ply obeying the instructions of a computer, rather than
deciding for themselves how much money to return to
the particpants. The subsequent responses to the faces
confirmed that the attribution of intention was crucial.
Liking and disliking only emerged for the faces of those
who played as free agents and could therefore be held
responsible for their actions. Participants in the game
were not simply learning which faces were associated
with reward. They were learning who to trust.
Cues about trustworthiness can be more indirect.
Bayliss and Tipper [9] used eye gaze direction as
a cue in a spatial attention task. Some faces reliably
looked toward the target location, while others more
often looked in the wrong direction. Subsequently,
participants rated the people who had looked in the
wrong direction as less trustworthy.
Intentions
Mental states such as desires and intentions are invis-
ible, but we can learn about them by watching other
people’s movements and the direction of their gaze.
Gaze is a telltale sign of what someone is interested
in. This use of gaze appears early in life: Lee and
colleagues [33] showed children pictures of a boy
(Larry) surrounded by four different objects. Two-year
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decide which toy he wanted.
We are finely attuned to inferring goals from move-
ments, not only from movement of the eyes and face,
but of the whole body, and particularly arms and
hands. Even 6-month-old babies respond with inter-
ested looks when they see an adult reach to a novel
goal but habituate when an adult reaches to the
same goal repeatedly [34]. Hamilton and Grafton [35]
used a similar approach where they showed adults
a series of movies depicting an actor repeatedly reach-
ing to the same goal, and using the same movement
unexpectedly reaching to a different goal. Repeated
presentation of the same goal caused a suppression
of brain activation in two regions of the left anterior in-
traparietal sulcus (Figure 1). This finding suggests that
the anterior intraparietal sulcus is critical for represent-
ing the goal of an observed action.
Our ability to perceive the goals and intentions of
others from watching their movements is often
ascribed to mirror neurons. These neurons become
active when animals observe an action as well as
when they execute the same action [36]. In humans,
a more extensive mirror system has been identified
[37]. In addition to regions in inferior frontal cortex
and inferior parietal cortex that are activated by action
observation and action execution, there are regions in
anterior cingulate and anterior insula cortex that are
activated by the experience and by the observation
of emotions such as disgust [13], and pain [11]. By link-
ing action observation to action execution, the brain’s
mirror system provides a mechanism for inferring the
intention or goal of the person whose action is being
observed.
Watching eye movements and other kinds of biolog-
ical motion reliably elicits activity in the posterior end of
the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS, see Figure 1), es-
pecially on the right [38]. The STS is therefore often
treated as part of the mirror system, although execu-
tion of action is not associated with activity in this
region. However, the magnitude of this activation de-
pends upon context in which the movement occurs.
Here we wish to highlight the importance of prior pre-
dictions that we make about another person’s actions.
Pelphrey and colleagues [39] created a visual display in
which an avatar looked either towards or away from
a visual stimulus that suddenly appeared to the left or
the right. Activity in pSTS of observers was greater
when the avatar looked away from the stimulus. A sim-
ilar result was obtained when observers watched
reaching and grasping movements [40]. More activity
was seen in pSTS when the avatar did not reach for
the salient stimulus. Clearly, observers expect the ava-
tar to attend to, or reach for, the salient stimulus. When
this prediction is violated the observer has to think
again about what the intentions and goals of the avatar
might be. This elicits greater activity in STS.
More direct evidence that activity can be elicited in
pSTS by a failure to predict intentions comes from
a study by Saxe and colleagues [41]. Observers
watched an actor disappear behind a bookcase and
then emerge from the other side. Greater activity was
elicited in pSTS when there was an unexpected delay
in the actor’s reemergence. Evidence such as this forthe importance of prediction and prediction errors in
action observation suggests possible mechanisms,
analogous to predictive coding in vision [42], by which
the brain’s mirror system might be used to perceive
goals and intentions [43].
Creating a Shared World
A major function of social cognition in humans is to
allow us to create a shared world in which we can inter-
act. The mirror system enables a simple form of shar-
ing [44]. Areas in the brain associated with pain or
touch are activated when we observe others in pain
[45] or being touched [46]. Through these forms of
empathy, the feelings of two people who are interact-
ing become aligned. We have already mentioned the
chameleon effect [6]: this refers to the observation
that, when two people are interacting, they start imitat-
ing each other’s actions leading to synchronised
leg-crossing, nodding, and so on. When this alignment
occurs the protagonists feel that they have greater
rapport. Communication can be further enhanced by
adopting a shared vocabulary, which enables us to
share goals so that we can engage in joint activities —
common ground [47].
For successful interactions it is not enough to share
feelings. We also need to share representations of the
world. Ideally, we should share each other’s perception
of the world. The starting point for sharing our percep-
tion about the world is to align the focus of our
attention. This process is called joint attention and is
typically achieved by pointing at an object. This leads
to the triadic relationship in which two people focus their
attention on the same object. Background and fore-
ground in their two perceptual worlds are now aligned.
The ability to share attention in this way can beobserved
in infants as young as 12 months (Figure 2) [48,49].
Recent studies have shown that people share the
representation of a task as a whole, even when each
performs only part of it. In one paradigm [50], a pair
of participants performed a ‘go-nogo’ task, sitting
alongside each other. Even though no interpersonal
coordination was required, each actor integrated the
co-actor’s alternative action into their own action plan-
ning. This resulted in an action selection conflict when
a stimulus required different action from each actor,
such as a ‘nogo’ response from one actor and a ‘go’
response from the other (see also [51]). In spite of
this interference, the task was still performed faster
when shared between two people than when per-
formed by a single person as a two-choice reaction
time task.
In a shared world, many tasks demand complemen-
tary rather than imitative actions. For example, when
two people are carrying a heavy object, one may
walk facing backwards, while the other walks
forwards. In these circumstances the shared represen-
tation of the task should be in terms of goals rather
than specific motor movements [52]. When interper-
sonal coordination is required to perform a simple re-
action time task, complex strategies for sharing con-
trol of the movement spontaneously arise. In one
study [53], when having to make a single rapid move-
ment, one actor controlled the acceleration phase
of the movement, while the other controlled the
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theexperimenter reactswith joint attention.
Twelve-month-olds point to share atten-
tion and interest. (Reproduced with
permission from [49].)deceleration phase. This complementary form of con-
trol enables the two-person action to be more efficient
than the same action performed by a single person.
Processes for creating a shared world have been
studied most extensively in the context of spoken
dialogue (for example [54]). For example, speakers
give largely unconscious eye gaze signals to control
turn taking in discourse [55]. Likewise, they use inter-
jections like ‘ah’ and ‘um’ to signal respectively forth-
coming smaller or larger delays in speaking so as to
avoid premature interruption [56]. There is substantial
evidence that speakers co-ordinate their contributions
in dialogue through having common ground. This
common ground is partly created in the long-term
by learning and culture, but needs also to be rapidly
established at the beginning of any cooperative
endeavour [57].
Not only do we need a common goal in order to
achieve the joint action, we also need to have a com-
mon view of the nature of the task we are carrying
out [58]. This applies both at a concrete level — it is
better to be able to see what the other person is doing
[59], but also at a conceptual level. We need, for exam-
ple, to have an agreed vocabulary for describing the
objects we are manipulating [60]. Two speakers also
become more similar in their use of syntax. In one
study [61], pairs of speakers had to take turns in de-
scribing pictures to each other. One speaker was
a confederate of the experimenter and produced
descriptions that systematically varied in syntactic
structure. This primed a similar syntactic structure in
the other speaker’s subsequent description. As with
the reading of intentions, the alignments that develop
during discourse may depend upon prediction and
emulation [62].
All these signals, which so strongly affect our verbal
interactions, are largely unconscious and often come
as a surprise when revealed by clever experiments.
In the following section we will turn to conscious sig-
nals and the deliberate rather than automatic creation
of a shared world.
Extracting Meaning from Social Signals
In the first part of this review we gave examples of how
we learn about the world by observing other people
when the signals in question are mostly unintentional.In human society, however, there is a much larger
class of signals that are sent deliberately, rather than
unintentionally, and this is complemented by a class
of signals that we withhold or disguise. This means
that we can control to some extent when others can
acquire knowledge from us. The ability to attribute
and manipulate mental states, such as knowledge
and ignorance, in others is part and parcel of the ca-
pacity to mentalize.
Mentalizing is a prerequisite for the ability to partic-
ipate in a deliberately and consciously shared social
world. The development of mentalizing is a long
drawn-out process. We already mentioned the work
by Gergely and colleagues [21] suggesting that only
above the age of 18 months do infants recognise that
different people have different attitudes to objects,
so that their response to the object may be telling us
something about the person rather than the object.
At this stage the infant is representing the mental state
of the person: for example, that they fear an object that
most people like. Infants can also recognise that an
adult may have a desire to communicate. Once this
stage is reached, both sender and receiver can treat
social signals as deliberately communicative. Infants
can now interpret signals as ‘ostensive’ [63], indicating
the sender’s overt communicative intention to reveal
new and relevant information about an object that is
identified by non-verbal cues (such as gaze direction
or pointing) [21].
It is possible that there are even earlier forms or pre-
cursors of mentalizing, as seen in the ability to tease
and understand teasing at the end of the first year of
life [64]. Similarly, we find indications in a number of
other species that they exhibit behaviour that we can
readily interpret as teasing, pretense and joint atten-
tion (for example [65]). The ability to engage in joint at-
tention behaviour and its development in pre-linguistic
infants between 9 and 15 months has been studied
extensively [66] and has given rise to a theory of shared
intentionality. Tomasello and colleagues [67,68]
suggest that there is a drive towards social coopera-
tion, which unites the earliest social attempts at com-
munication with advanced attempts at culturally de-
fined social learning. Infants respond to the gaze of
adults towards an object of interest with evident signs
of pleasure and engagement from about 10 months,
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wards objects by pointing, facial expressions or vocal-
isations (see Figure 2). From about 12 months, infants
will move to follow an adult’s gaze over barriers to find
a target that is out of their view, thus showing that they
implicitly grasp the notion that seeing is knowing [69].
Further, at 12 months of age infants can understand
what is old news and new news for other people [70].
From here, it is but a small step towards social cooper-
ation, as shown in remarkable videos of prelinguistic
toddlers who spontaneously open a door for an adult
who is carrying a load with both hands [71].
The fact that the ability to take into account the men-
tal states of others is available so early in life means
that it can have downstream effects on other aspects
of cognitive development. In particular it is critical for
learning words [72,73]. First, the infant can recognise
those signals where the mother is naming an object
for the infant to learn and distinguish them from those
signals in which spoken words and objects come to-
gether incidentally [74]. Second, the infant can pick
out the person who knows something from the person
who does not, and pay special attention to the signals
coming from the one who knows [75,76]. It is this ability
to pick out the signals that are reliable and have com-
municative intent that enables infants to learn at the
amazing rate of ten new words a day [77]. Furthermore,
children learn abstract words relating to mental states,
such as wishes, thoughts, intentions and beliefs very
early [78] and most readily when cues from meaning
and syntax converge [79].
The literature on Theory of Mind — the ability to pre-
dict and explain other people’s behaviour in terms of
mental states — highlights a step change in develop-
ment. Children younger than about 5 years are not ex-
plicitly aware of mental states and their role in com-
munication [80]. Yet, there are abundant signs of an
implicit awareness of other’s intentions and desires
from at least about 18 months. A famous example is
pretend play. Young children from about 18 months
are able to understand and preferentially attend to sig-
nals of pretense, such as exaggerated voices and ex-
pressive features. Indeed the hallmark of this behav-
iour is that children do not mistake the signals of
pretense for information about the state of affairs in
the real world [81]. However, this understanding is im-
plicit and thus differs from the explicit justification of
a false belief and the assured prediction of the behav-
ioural consequences at age 5.
We believe that the same step change applies to the
implicit and explicit understanding of communicative
signals. Indeed the gap is intimately connected with
the cultural leap that has led to institutionalized teach-
ing and trading. Thus it is no coincidence that the age
of school entry in most cultures is round about the
landmark age of 5. Most people would agree that, leav-
ing aside exceptionally precocious children, it is diffi-
cult to engage children younger than 5 in explicit
teaching and learning. Clearly this learning depends
on full awareness of communicative signals. Under-
standing the meaning of these signals allows us also
to manipulate other people’s mental states. Thus, we
can engage in reputation management by using social
signals to manipulate what other people think about us.Through being aware that socials signals are com-
municative, we can use them to transmit ideas effi-
ciently from one mind to another [82]. Such signals
have meaning and can be true or false. For example,
when we tell a lie we use signals to create a false belief
in another person’s mind. The ability to deliberately
deceive is well developed in humans with explicit
knowledge of false beliefs and their use in deception
is manifest from the age of about 5 years [83]. This abil-
ity is not found in monkeys, but may be seen in a rudi-
mentary form in great apes [84,85]. The ability to repre-
sent the mental states of self and others, upon which
deception depends, is supported by a network of brain
regions, including medial prefrontal cortex and
temporo-parietal junction [86,87] (see Figure 1).
Consciousness and Social Cognition
In earlier sections of this essay we have seen that
much of the processing of social signals occurs auto-
matically and without the need for awareness. We re-
spond emotionally to a fearful face even when we are
unaware of seeing that face [88]. Likewise we can be
conditioned to show a fearful response to a previ-
ously neutral stimulus — the conditioned stimulus,
CS+ — when this is repeatedly followed by a shock —
the unconditioned stimulus, US — without awareness
of that stimulus [89]. Phelps and colleagues [90] have
shown that learning fear from observing others being
conditioned can also occur without awareness of the
conditioned stimulus. However, this does not happen
with instructed fear. In instructed fear, the experi-
menter tells the subject that the presentation of a pre-
viously neutral stimulus (a blue square for example)
will be followed by a shock. After such an instruction,
the presentation of the stimulus is followed by
autonomic arousal and other signs of fear. But, in
contrast to learning fear by conditioning or by
observation, this effect of instructed fear does not
occur if the stimulus is masked and does not reach
awareness [15].
This result hints at the idea that consciousness is re-
quired for the kinds of representations that are created
by deliberately communicative signals. Evidence in
favour of this idea is as yet sparse. There is still no
agreed procedure for determining unequivocally
whether events have been registered without con-
sciousness (for example [91]). Nevertheless it is gener-
ally agreed that information processing in the brain
largely occurs without awareness [92]. This leaves
open the question as to how processing associated
with consciousness should be characterised. It also
leaves open the question of what the function of con-
sciousness might be. In the previous section we have
suggested that conscious representations have a spe-
cial role in the shared social world that is created by
deliberate communicative signals. Rather than being
private, conscious experiences are represented in
a form that can be shared with others, thereby creating
the common ground for culture [93].
Another hint of the relevance of consciousness for
social cognition comes from a study of race prejudice.
Amodio and colleagues [94] recorded electro-enceph-
alograms (EEGs) while participants performed a cogni-
tive task purporting to measure their level of race bias
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observed by an ostensibly non-prejudiced experi-
menter (in public). Control of responses in private
was associated with the amplitude of error-related
negativity. This component of the EEG occurs within
milliseconds of a response and reflects an early, pre-
conscious stage of conflict monitoring. By contrast,
when responding in public, better control of respond-
ing was associated with the amplitude of the error-
related positivity component of the EEG. This occurs
later,w200 milliseconds after responding and is asso-
ciated with awareness of error commission [95,96].
Error correcting in public in this task is concerned
with reputation building: trying to influence how we
are seen by others. The sources of these two error
related components of the EEG have been located in
the anterior cingulate cortex, with the source of the
component associated with awareness being more
anterior [96,97]. This more anterior region of anterior
cingulate cortex and adjacent paracingulate cortex
(anterior rostral medial frontal cortex) has been associ-
ated with meta-cognition (thinking about thinking) [98]
and the uniquely human representation of triadic rela-
tions between two minds and an object [99] (see
Figure 1).
In a clinical setting, a lack of awareness of our own
failings is referred to as a lack of insight. This is a
feature of many disorders of social interaction and
communication, including autism, schizophrenia and
various forms of dementia. Patients with dementia
and accompanying loss of insight into their own fail-
ings also show reduced empathy and impaired recog-
nition of emotional expressions [100]. This highlights
the link between awareness of self and awareness of
others. Our suggestion is that this link arises because
awareness of self might be more accurately described
as awareness of self as others see us.
Conclusions
In this review we have drawn together studies that
highlight the importance of social signals. These sig-
nals act as gatekeepers for learning about the world
from other people, making it possible to enhance our
own learning through the experience of others. They
also are critical in learning about other people and in
particular whether or not we should trust them and
value the social signals they send. In learning about
the world as well as in learning about other people,
we can distinguish purely automatic signals and con-
scious signals. The evidence we have discussed sug-
gests that it is the deliberate and conscious signals
that are crucial to creating a shared social world of
which we are in control. This shared world is particu-
larly refined in verbal communication, where meanings
of words and concepts can be measured by the degree
of shared understanding. At the same time to share
meanings and to negotiate the social world we need
to be aware of our own and other’s beliefs, knowledge
and feelings.
Thus the emergence of consciousness goes hand in
hand with the development of advanced social signal-
ling. This may explain why the most pervasive task in
our social life is the management of our own reputa-
tion, both in our own eyes and in the eyes of others.A shared culture allows both these viewpoints to be
aligned. The evolutionary benefits of such coordina-
tion may be seen in enhanced cooperation and the
continuous intergenerational creation of what we call
culture. Conversely, the absence of such alignment
can be seen to result in disturbed and pathological
social interactions.
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